The “Kupamanduka” Syndrome and the Political Legacy of the TPLF

[TLM Editorial Viewpoint]

At an international conference in July 2000, Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics (1998), expressed concern about a stagnant society resistant to embracing new realities. He cited an ancient Sanskrit story of “kupamanduka,” a simple tale of a well-frog—the frog that lives its entire life in a well—and its refusal to accept the existence outside its limited world. [Amartya Sen, “Why Human Security” presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, 28 July 2000, p. 7. Though the article defended globalization, it remains relevant to our limited perspective.]

 We, Tegrawot and Ethiopians “politicians,” have all become “well-frogs” living in small, confined spaces within our political groups. We often find it hard to look beyond our own ambitions or to see past the walls of the ideological wells we’ve built. Our imagination is limited by the prejudices that blind us, which keep us from engaging deeply and meaningfully in the life of Tigray. As a result, our impact on the lives of our fellow countrymen is only superficial, touching them only in passing.

 We are indeed nearing another critical point in our nation’s turbulent history. The TPLF’s ideology and its deceitful regime are heading toward a self-destructive downfall and political marginalization. In light of this, various political factions and individuals are vying for strategic advantage by positioning themselves prominently amid ongoing clashes to boost their support. During uncertain times, all groups tend to perform at their peak. We witness a range of tactics—some more refined, but most repetitive, awkward, and overt.

TLM supports anyone forming political teams or organizations and passionately sharing their vision with the Ethiopian people, campaigning fully for leadership positions. However, we’ve noticed that we currently have many ‘Chiefs’ but not enough ‘Indians.’ It also appears that many political groups are trying to reach some form of political agreement—mirroring the 1991 undemocratic transfer of power from one dictatorial regime to another, without considering the rights of millions. There’s a risk that history might repeat itself, which is unfortunate; perhaps we haven’t truly learned from the past decade’s events. 

Nearly all existing Ethiopian political organizations are built on an outdated elitist class framework that has little relevance to the realities faced by Ethiopian citizens. Membership is usually limited to a small, urban-based group primarily made up of small business owners and semi-feudal professionals. Together, these groups account for only a small portion of the Ethiopian population. As far as we can see, they are insignificant and do not truly represent the voice of the Ethiopian people. It’s an act of pure arrogance and narcissism for such groups to aim to seize state power through these superficial structures.

 Therefore, we offer suggestions for our future involvement in our country’s political and economic life. Our history clearly shows that we are not short of ambitious individuals willing to risk their lives and futures to gain political power.

Given that our nation is a mosaic of diverse cultures, the intensity of individuals’ desire for power varies as much as the communities that foster such political ambitions. Generally, highlanders tend to envision hierarchically structured, militaristic political organizations, while lowlanders prefer more horizontal power divisions with some hierarchical elements. Neither group fully safeguards nor respects individual political or human rights. Both possess strengths and weaknesses, and the key is to learn from them and build on their respective advantages.

 It is quite easy to propose ambitious political and economic plans when seeking support from the Ethiopian people. However, problems arise after gaining political power and control over Ethiopia’s military. Therefore, to prevent repeating past errors—such as allowing minor conspiratorial groups to seize power and use Ethiopia’s armed forces to impose new dictators—Ethiopia’s armed forces will remain independent and not be subordinate to any politician or political group.

 Any politician aiming for state power must work at the grassroots to advance their organization’s political and economic agenda. This time, no political group should exploit the transition, unlike in 1975-78 and 1991, when groups with limited support were regarded as genuine representatives of Ethiopia’s people. During this transition, the primary role of the transitional government is to ensure full participation of Ethiopians in shaping their political future. Later, during elections, the people of Ethiopia are responsible for choosing their representatives and leaders. Consequently, a conference like the 1991 one should not occur again, where a small number of political organizations, some with fewer than fifty members, determine who will lead the country, while the Ethiopian people observe in silence as a few outsiders decide their future.

1. As previously stated, the most effective strategy following Debretsion and his team’s departure from office is to establish a short two-year transition period. During this time, political parties will not be involved in the transitional government. Instead, neutral, and respected Tegrawot—who were not part of the TPLF bureaucracy—will form a transitional authority. Their aim is to ready the country for a nationwide election in two years and to draft a new constitution.
2. We recommend that village elders, businessmen, schoolteachers, retired labor leaders, and officials not participate. Religious leaders will support this period with spiritual guidance and prayer. The specifics of organizing or conducting elections for a permanent government may be difficult to determine at this stage. Nonetheless, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of what a transitional government entails.
3. The transition period is solely dedicated to restoring stability, managing the civil service, collecting taxes, settling international debts, drafting a new constitution, and organizing election districts. This is not a period where political groups take control of the government through coalitions and then compete among themselves to achieve exclusive power, as happened over the past ten years.
4. People in the transition government will not be permitted to run for elected positions or hold ministerial or senior government roles after the transition period concludes and a new government is established.

Throughout history, our armed forces have been exploited and turned into instruments of oppression, violence, and civilian suffering. For instance, leaders from Emperor Haile Selassie to Abiy Ahammed have misused Ethiopian soldiers to commit brutal acts, resulting in the death of tens of thousands of Ethiopians. Moving forward, Ethiopia’s military will serve the people, ensuring they are no longer used by politicians for harmful purposes.

The most urgent question facing our country is what actions must be taken immediately. Before forming a transitional government, we need a clear plan for replacing the current administration. The TPLF and its allies are unlikely to leave voluntarily. Why would they? Consequently, change is likely only through widespread civil disobedience leading to a collapse of civil authority, or through the forced removal of the government. However, the demonstrations and protests so far—being limited, simple, and nonviolent—are insufficient to effect a change in government.

The arrival of another dictatorial regime formed by recycled officials and opportunist political groups, or the creation of a transitional government appointed by political figures of their choosing, will lead to Ethiopia’s disintegration. Therefore, an armed struggle is absolutely necessary. This struggle should be unified under a single command, aiming to gain popular support and ultimately incorporate the Ethiopian Army into a new liberated military force. This new armed force should operate independently of the transitional or future government for a designated period.

The armed struggle of TPF must have three distinct goals objectives: (1) to oust the TPLF leadership, (2) to detach the TDF army from political influence so it could defend Tigray’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and (3) to protect the human and political rights of every Tegrawot, regardless of Aweraja, social status, age, gender, or religion.

Separating military Power Versus Political Power

As noted earlier, Ethiopian armed men and women have been exploited by every political leader who has governed Ethiopia. Given these poor records, one would hope for fresh ideas from future leaders and their political groups. Sadly, the past thirty years show no such innovation: no group has proposed a creative solution. Instead, we have seen ideology devoid of substance, ambitions lacking discipline, and widespread corruption.

 It is simply a matter of studying the political and economic programs and observing the activities of Ethiopian political organizations and their support groups to see that, over the last thirty years, no creative proposals have been presented by any group.

Leftist organizations like the TPLF frequently overlook the people of Tigrai as the genuine holders of political authority. Most political leaders we know seek to control the army first, then impose their political, economic, and leadership agendas on the Tigrai population through force. Hearing the voices of such raw ambition is both disappointing and alarming. We tend to see political power as a reward for our own personal gain rather than for public service.

We are confident that there is a direct link between gaining political power and the subsequent mistreatment and violation of the human and political rights of Ethiopian citizens by leaders who can command the military to carry out their violent acts. This connection is quite straightforward and understood. If we strip our politicians of the authority to command Ethiopia’s armed forces, we can better manage potential future harm and protect the Ethiopian people from the damage caused by previous dictatorial rulers.

Due to the serious threat to Ethiopia’s national integrity and sovereignty, we must implement exceptional measures. The key proposal is temporarily removing military command from political leaders. The military will operate under its own command structure and focus solely on defense duties without interference or influence from political groups. This approach ensures that our armed forces remain fully dedicated to protecting our nation’s unity and sovereignty. Additionally, the Ethiopian Army is prohibited from participating in political activities, whether in support of or in opposition to political organizations, and will not be involved in civilian administrative roles.

The armed men of Ethiopia must carry out the following goals:

1. Defend and uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia.
2. Restore unity and harmony throughout all of Ethiopia.
3. Lay the foundation for building political and civic democracy.
4. Empower Ethiopian people with full political rights and protect democratic and human rights for everyone.
5. Eliminate all divisive strategies introduced by Meles Zenawi EPRDF.
6. Release all political prisoners, including TPLF leaders and leaders from other political groups.
7. Hold accountable all high-ranking government officials involved in Ethiopia’s dismemberment, as documented by the Hague Boundary Commission decision.

Critics may see our suggestions as a nostalgic return to Ethiopia’s chauvinistic past, which Ethiopians have already discarded. There’s also the risk of the military seizing power again, as in the 1970s with Mengistu Hailemariam, one of Ethiopia’s worst dictators.
Implementing safeguards such as checks and balances could help prevent another military dictatorship, an area where experienced Ethiopians can contribute to addressing the cyclical leadership issue. This article remains open-ended without a final conclusion. However, we can reiterate how to engage with various ideologies. Nothing is inherent in any ideology; it depends on our contributions. Ideologies are conceptual, unlike social realities. We use ideas to address communal and individual survival challenges. We should identify effective, practical, durable, and minimally harmful ideas to address social, political, and economic issues.

Our pursuit of new solutions and ideas has led us to endorse untested governmental systems for Ethiopians. All innovative and experimental approaches carry inherent risks, and mine are no exception. I believe I have presented a core truth and potential solutions that could evolve into a comprehensive remedy for our recurring issues. For successful implementation, one must genuinely love and respect every Ethiopian, embracing their flaws. Anything less than this unconditional dedication will not suffice to resolve our uniquely challenging problems.